Introduction. During the past two decades philosophers of psychology have considered a large variety of computational models for philosophy of mind and more recently for cognitive science. Among the suggested models are computer programs, Turing machines, pushdown automata, linear bounded automata, finite state automata and sequential machines. Many philosophers have found finite state automata models to be the most appealing, for various reasons, although there has been no shortage of defenders of programs and Turing machines. A paper by Arthur Burks (...) convinced me long ago that “all natural human functions” are, or can be fruitfully modeled to be, finite state automata with output. Further work in the field has reinforced this conviction. There is room, however, for the use of any of the above models in philosophy of mind and in the ongoing development of cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that certain stimulus-response learning models which are adequate to represent finite automata (acceptors) are not adequate to represent noninitial state input-output automata (transducers). This circumstance suggests the question whether or not the behavior of animals if satisfactorily modelled by automata is predictive. It is argued in partial answer that there are automata which can be explained in the sense that their transition and output functions can be described (roughly, Hempel-type covering law explanation) while their (...) behaviors are in principle not predictable short of possession of their complete histories or of information concerning present internal states by indirect observation. (shrink)

Calcium ions act as modulators of many fundamental processes in eukaryotic cells. Although these processes apparently involve initial interactions between calcium ions and cell membranes, the identity of the putative membrane Ca2+‐binding proteins has until recently been obscure. This article describes a recently discovered family of mammalian membrane proteins, of perhaps ancient origin, that may fulfil this function.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Exposition of The Divine Names, The Book of Blessed Dionysius by Thomas AquinasMichael J. Rubin, Elizabeth C. Shaw, and Staff*AQUINAS, Thomas. An Exposition of The Divine Names, The Book of Blessed Dionysius. Translated and edited with an introduction by Michael A. Augros. Merrimack, N.H.: Thomas More College Press, 2021. xxv + 549 pp. Cloth, $65.00The profound influence that Pseudo-Dionysius had on Aquinas’s thought, especially in his (...) metaphysics of participation and his apophatic theology, has been known for some time now, thanks to the excellent work of such scholars as Fran O’Rourke. One would therefore think that Aquinas’s Exposition of the Divine Names (his only commentary on the works of Pseudo-Dionysius) would have been translated a lot sooner. This delay is assuredly due not just to the difficulty of translating this work but also to a certain embarrassment felt by Thomists over Aquinas’s sincere belief that the “Dionysius” who wrote the Divine Names was the Areopagite whose conversion at the teaching of St. Paul is mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles. That the author calling himself “Dionysius” was in fact a theologian writing in the fifth or sixth centuries has been well established by modern scholarship. Hence, Thomists may have felt tempted to discount or at least pass over the influence of this author on Aquinas since it is discomfiting to think that the Church’s greatest theologian accorded such authority to an imposter.Michael Augros tackles these concerns head-on in the excellent introduction to his new translation of the Divine Names commentary. First, Augros points out that in past centuries a pseudonym was usually not an act of forgery but, rather, a way of concealing the author’s identity, which an early Christian theologian might well decide to do either out of humility or out of a desire “to avoid provoking certain prejudices” in those who disagreed with him in contemporary theological disputes. Moreover, it is likely that the work was never intended for the general public (who could easily mistake the pseudonym as genuine) but, rather, was written for those “already initiated in a particular Neoplatonic school of Christian theology,” who would recognize the author as being “one of their own” but without knowing his precise identity. Finally, in taking the particular name of “Dionysius,” the author of the Divine Names was indicating his intention for the work: Just as the biblical Dionysius was a Greek philosopher who converted to Christianity, so the works of Pseudo-Dionysius [End Page 345] are an attempt to reconcile Greek philosophy with the Christian faith.It therefore seems likely, as Augros observes, that Aquinas would still have accorded a great deal of respect to the Divine Names even if he had learned the truth of the author’s identity. The work would not have had the same deuterocanonical authority for him that comes with being written by a direct disciple of St. Paul himself, but “the inherent cogency, coherence, and beauty” of Pseudo-Dionysius’s theology would have been the same. Hence, Pseudo-Dionysius would surely have earned from Aquinas the “docile attitude” appropriate “for a philosopher and theologian of the first order, such as Boethius.”That Aquinas was right to see the author of the Divine Names as a master philosopher and theologian becomes evident when one dives into the text itself, in which Aquinas sees a truly dazzling order, both externally and internally. According to Aquinas, the Divine Names discusses those truths about God of which there are intelligible likenesses in creatures, such as goodness or wisdom, whereas the truths about God of which there are sensible likenesses (for example, “when God is called a lion, or a rock”) are treated by Pseudo-Dionysius in The Symbolic Theology; meanwhile, in the lost or fictional work The Divine Characteristics, Dionysius claims to have treated those truths about God (such as the Trinity) that cannot be known through any likenesses in creatures.Aquinas finds a still more intricate order within the Divine Names itself. Since this work is dedicated to “the divine names by which the processions of God to creatures are manifested,” the plan of the work... (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 10, October 2020, Page 96-98.

In the mid-nineteenth century, healthcare delivery began transitioning from an individual, private payment model to a third-party payment model, dominated by the insurance industry. During the same time, productivity shifted from a transformational model, centered on the provider-patient relationship, to a transactional model, based on the distribution of services. The emergence of medical insurance and other third-party payers removed providers and patients from discussions about treatment plans, payment, and risk. This resulted in a weakening, if not fracturing, of the provider-patient (...) relationship. All healthcare providers enter their profession to care for people, yet what has most frequently been lost in the transformed relationship over the past century is context, communication, and trust—all elements of a relational ethic, or what ethicist and psychologist Carol Gilligan first described as, “the ethics of care.” This loss of relationality has led to a model of healthcare delivery that is fractured, isolated, and uncoordinated, with an epidemic of medical errors that by some estimates results in the death of approximately 400,000 individuals per year. Thus far, isolated foci on patient quality, outcomes, and safety have been feckless and unimpressive. However, new advanced payment models, such as value-based purchasing and patient-centered medical homes, have the potential to reduce medical error by addressing its root cause. In linking payment to factors such as context, communication, and trust, they bring relationality back into the healthcare system. This essay traces the historic devolution of the provider-patient relationship and the promise of new payment models to restore it. (shrink)

This is a new edition of a classic textbook in health care ethics, one that offers an alternative to the principle-based approach from Beauchamp and Childress (Principles of Biomedical Ethics, now in its seventh edition from OUP) and traditional Catholic approaches of Ashley and O'Rourke. In the early chapters Devettere spells out the meaning of ethics and the importance of prudential reasoning in seeking the good life. The rest of the book deals with issues and cases, including determinations of life (...) and death, reproduction and research and genetics, and the distribution of health care. In this fourth edition Devettere updates all chapters and adds new cases and new sections on the following: neuroscience, social psychology, overriding advance directives, studies on the fetus, the palliative care movement, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, pharmacists and reproductive issues, prenatal life and abortion, neonatal testing and mandatory vaccinations, the US governments' STD research in Guatemala, the emergence of biobanks, facial transplantations, genetic testing, legal issues around the Affordable Care Act, and more. This is an accessible and comprehensive textbook covering all aspects of the field. (shrink)